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The Patent System in Pre-1989 Czechoslovakia
The chapter analyzes patent law in Czechoslovakia in the period from 1945 until the end of communist rule in 1989. In addition to reviewing the legislative development of patent law -the laws on the books -the chapter explains the law in action, which includes the application of the law in practice and the attitudes of Czechoslovak society toward inventive activities and patenting. The chapter shows that post-1945 Czechoslovak patent law drew on a highly developed pre-1940 Czechoslovak patent law and practice that was based on the Austrian patent law inherited by Czechoslovakia in 1918 when it split from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Although Czechoslovak patent experts after 1948 were under severe pressure to adopt the Soviet patent law model, it was not until 1972 that the Soviet model was fully imposed upon the Czechoslovak patent system. Notwithstanding the political distortions forced upon the Czechoslovak patent system in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s, the legacy of a high level of technical expertise developed under the Austro-Hungarian Empire survived in Czechoslovakia in large measure through the end of communist rule in 1989.
The chapter aims to achieve three goals. First, it aims to dispel misperceptions that have appeared in some recent scholarship that no developed patent system existed in Czechoslovakia prior to 1989. Second, the chapter contributes to the recent trend in the historiography of the Soviet bloc countries with a showing that patent law development was not uniform across the Soviet bloc, with an explanation that the development did not occur in complete isolation from the West, and with a presentation of the practical everyday effects of the patent system on the people of Czechoslovakia. Third, the chapter presents features of the Czechoslovak patent system that might be of interest to current critics of patent systems in various countries. Critics interested in changing from the property rule to the liability rule in patent law may find the Czechoslovak system interesting because the Czechoslovak system de facto deprived most inventors of injunctions. Critics who are concerned about rewards for unpatentable discoveries may find it useful to learn about the protection for such discoveries that appeared in Czechoslovak law until 1990. The lessons learned in Czechoslovakia in the pre-1989 period are not easily transferable to current practice, and particularly not to any democratic society with a functioning market economy; however, it is helpful to recall and understand the functioning of the features and the impact that they had on inventive activity within their past context to see if any of the lessons might be relevant today. This is a draft chapter that will appear in 'Intellectual Property in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States' (Mira T. Sundara Rajan, ed., LexisNexis, forthcoming in 2014).
Czechoslovakia and, although it was distorted in various ways because of political, social, and economic circumstances, it was built on and carried forward the legacy of a well-developed pre-1940 patent law inherited from Austria, at least in terms of a high level of technical expertise.
This chapter reviews the patent law of Czechoslovakia in the period from the end of WWII in 1945 until the Velvet Revolution in 1989 and analyzes the stages in the development of Czechoslovak patent law during that period.
The state of Czechoslovak patent law on the books did not necessarily reflect the law in action and society's attitudes toward innovation and patenting. Therefore, in addition to presenting the development of the law on the books, this chapter shows that there was inventive activity and patenting in pre-1989 Czechoslovakia, and that the patent system provided certain incentives to inventors. The Czechoslovak population was aware of the importance of inventive activity and patenting; the realization by the people of Czechoslovakia of how much the country, which was one of the most industrialized nations in the world before WWII, fell behind the West in innovation and technology contributed to the change in its political regime in 1989; an August 1989 article by an employee of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences that highlighted the magnitude of the lag behind the West generated a strong response in pre-Velvet Revolution Czechoslovakia. 3 (last visited June 25, 2013) (using the Czech Republic in a sample of countries in a study with the expectation "that the results obtained [through the study] will provide some insight into the impact of such regional patent systems on developing countries in the rest of the world." Id., 2.). 3 The article, entitled "Prognostics and Perestroika," noted that the country's "lagging behind in some aspects of science and technological development [became] so significant that [the society] stopped realizing it." The author warned that the society started to "resemble a marathon runner whose competitors long disappeared over the horizon and therefore the runner can optimistically assume that he is now the leading runner." Miloš Zeman, Prognostika a přestavba, Technický magazín, No. 8, August 1989, pp. 6-9, at 7, available at By raising the awareness of Czechoslovak patent law development before 1989 the chapter contributes to the recent wave of historiography of the Cold War era that attempts to bring a nuanced picture of the developments in the various Soviet bloc countries prior to 1989. 4 There are three perspectives that this "new wave" of scholarship promotes that permeate this chapter.
First, the recent scholarship tries to dispel the myth of the perfect "inner cohesiveness" of the Soviet bloc and emphasizes that in many respects the Soviet bloc countries did not develop uniformly as a single homogenous entity. 5 This chapter shows that the development of patent law was also not uniform throughout the Soviet bloc; 6 although Czechoslovak patent law was strongly influenced by the Soviet model of patent law, Czechoslovak patent law development was not the same as that of the Soviet Union and of other countries of the Soviet bloc. Second, the recent scholarship points out that the Iron Curtain was not an "impermeable barrier" and that Czechoslovak patent law provided for injunctions, it created a system that looked somewhat like a liability rule system: in practice, inventors had almost no access to injunctions because the absolute majority of inventions were controlled by the state and the inventions could be utilized by all state-owned enterprises, which constituted the absolute majority of enterprises in the country. 10 The second feature of pre-1989 Czechoslovak patent law that might be instructive, because it speaks to some of the questions currently discussed in patent law, is the protection of and reward for unpatentable discoveries. 11 Czechoslovak law, analogously to the laws of some other countries of the Soviet bloc, provided for the registration of discoveries and rights to their authors.
12
Of course, the fact that Czechoslovak patent law included features of potential interest to the critics of patent systems today does not mean that experiences with those features in pre-1989
Czechoslovakia warrant conclusions about the suitability or lack thereof of the same features in current patent systems. The lessons learned in Czechoslovakia in the pre-1989 period are not easily transferrable to current practice, and particularly not to any democratic society with a functioning market economy. But it is helpful to recall and understand the functioning of the features and the impact that they had on inventive activity within their past context to see if any of the lessons might be relevant today. 10 On the consequences of state utilization of patents and state ownership of inventions see infra Part III.
11 For a historical overview of discussions about the protection of discoveries see Pretnar, supra note 6, pp. 6 ff.
12 Czechoslovakia was the first country of the Soviet bloc (even before the Soviet Union) to include registration of discoveries in a statute. Pretnar, supra note 6, p. 9. Not all countries of the Soviet bloc provided for the protection of discoveries; as of 1988, the countries that protected discoveries by statute were Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Cuba, and 31 Improvement proposals (or rationalization proposals) were not a Soviet invention; the concept of such proposals was common in enterprises throughout the world, including in the United States. But it was typical for countries of the Soviet bloc to provide for state protection of improvement proposals through statutes. For the history of improvement proposals from a comparative perspective see Pretnar, supra note 6, pp. 46 ff. remunerate the inventor based on the "societal benefit" of the invention.
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Two Czechoslovak patent commentators in 1990 observed that through the "offer of inventions to the state" the 1952 patent statute "made a major dent in the exclusivity of patents afforded in the legal orders of capitalistic countries." 38 However, communist commentators had earlier criticized the 1952 statute and the Hungarian law after which the statute had been modeled for not being sufficiently in line with communist doctrine; they pointed out that the Hungarian model could have easily functioned even in capitalist countries. 39 Indeed, as far as employee inventions were concerned, the only difference in Czechoslovakia from some of the patent 34 The incentives that the system provided to inventors to offer their inventions to the state are discussed infra in Part III. Soviet model, the statute provided for protection of both improvement proposals and discoveries (both are discussed later in this section). Second, the statute abolished "offers of inventions to the state"; instead, an offer and acceptance were no longer necessary because the right to utilize employee inventions (inventions developed by employees within the scope of their employment or with their employer's support) vested automatically in the state. 41 For inventions other than employee inventions the statute provided for the possibility of a "transfer of an invention to the state" ("odevzdání vynálezu státu") through which an inventor could transfer his invention to the state. 42 The state gained the right to utilize both employee inventions and transferred inventions, and the inventors of these inventions had a right to remuneration based on the "societal benefit" if the inventions were utilized.
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Although the 1957 statute moved Czechoslovak patent law closer to the Soviet model, the communist regime continued to pressure patent experts to adopt the Soviet model completely. called the "author" -received a confirmation of authorship and the right of priority; 64 the author also had the right to remuneration for the utilization of the invention, the right to participate in development, testing, and implementation of the invention into practice, and "other benefits provided by law." 65 The remuneration continued to be based on the "societal benefit" achieved through the utilization of the invention.
66
All three of the pre-1989 Czechoslovak patent statutes included protections for improvement proposals ("zlepšovací návrhy"), and the 1957 and 1972 statutes also provided protection for discoveries ("objevy"). 67 Czechoslovak law thus protected intellectual output that was outside the protection of a patent, either because of the lack of novelty (improvement proposals) or because of the subject matter (discoveries 68 The protections for the three types of intellectual outputs "reflect different categories of intellectual activity in the field of technical progress which, however, form links in an innovational chain." Pretnar, supra note 6, p. 3. On the protection for discoveries and improvement proposals (or rationalizations -see infra note 69 on the differences in terminology) in the countries of the Soviet bloc see Vida, supra note 54, pp. 914-921; Pretnar, supra note 6, pp. 46 ff. 69 In other countries, different terms were used for the same concept; what was called "improvement proposals" in Czechoslovakia were "rationalization proposals" in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Bulgaria, "rationalizations" in Albania, "innovative proposals" in East Germany, Hungary, and Romania, and "technical improvements" in Yugoslavia. Pretnar, supra note 6, p. 48.
proposed. 70 Applications for employee improvement proposals were filed with the employer enterprise; 71 applications for other improvement proposals were filed first with the patent office 72 and later with the enterprise that was expected to utilize the proposal. 73 If the application was accepted, the author of the proposal received a certificate 74 and had a right to remuneration based on the societal benefit of the proposed improvement. 75 Protection for discoveries encompassed all discoveries of "earlier unknown, objectively existing features, characteristics, or rules of the material world," 76 which had to be scientifically proven. 77 The patent office entered discoveries into a register and issued a diploma to the authors of the discoveries. 78 The authors of discoveries were entitled to remuneration. 79 At the end of the 1980s, the perestroika reform movement concluded that Czechoslovak patent law was not adequate for the development needed in the economy, and a 1987 resolution by the Czechoslovak cabinet that concerned the legal aspects of the implementation of perestroika in perestroika movement arrived in Czechoslovakia later than it did in the Soviet Union because the that was designed to serve the newly re-introduced market economy. The statute, which became effective on January 1, 1991, abolished author's certificates and returned the country to patents as the only form of protection for inventions. 86 In the case of employee inventions (inventions developed by employees within the scope of their employment), the right to a patent continued to vest in the employer; however, with fewer and fewer employers being state owned and with the state having less, if any, political influence in state enterprises, the state's control of patents began to diminish. 87 The 1990 law is still in force in the Czech Republic; it has been amended on multiple occasions since 1990, and a new section was added in 2000 concerning the European patent application and the European patent. 88 The law continues to maintain protection for improvement proposals, 89 but it discontinued protection for discoveries.
III. The Functioning of the Patent System in Pre-1989 Czechoslovakia
The rapid birth of the Czechoslovak patent system in 1918 was possible because of the welldeveloped patent law, experienced patent experts, and well-functioning modern industry that existed in the territory of Czechoslovakia under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After WWI, the patent system of the newly-independent country became operative shortly after the country was Only these inventors and authors could receive benefits, and therefore the absolute majority of inventors (and authors) of non-employee inventions offered their inventions to the state, transferred their inventions to the state, or opted for the protection available under an author's certificate.
The communist doctrine claimed as progress in the new social order that the state, through its exclusive utilization -and later ownership -of patents, could and would guarantee that inventions would be fully utilized to the benefit of the inventor and society, whose interests were considered identical; therefore, the theory went, it was possible to have the interests represented by a single entity -the state. 109 The state had the obligation to ensure that the invention was utilized and to remunerate the inventor based on the "societal benefit" that the utilization represented. 110 All state enterprises could utilize inventions owned by the state, 111 and the inventor had the right to be included in any further development and implementation of his invention. Of course, in practice the inventor had no possibility of influencing any potential underutilization of his invention, and the calculation of the "societal benefit" was complicated;
112 disputes over the amount of remuneration were common 113 and arose for a variety of reasons, including a certain lack of respect for intellectual activity, which attitude was typical of the communist ideology. 117 The requirement of permission for filing an application in a foreign patent office before an application was filed in the national patent office was and is not unusual; however, in Czechoslovakia the permission had to be obtained for any foreign patent filing, even when it was to occur after a patent application was filed in Czechoslovakia. 123 For example, in 1957 the maximum remuneration for an invention was set at CSK 500,000; however, remuneration higher than CSK 30,000 required the approval of a ministry. In 1986 the maximum remuneration was set at CSK 750,000. ŠTAFL, supra note 109, p. tax advantages to inventors and mandated that enterprises offer free advice to their employeeinventors. 124 Also, inventors paid no administrative fees to the patent office 125 and could be reimbursed for any expenses associated with their preparations of drawings, models, and prototypes. 126 The significance of additional benefits can be fully understood only in the context of the extreme scarcity that existed in the Soviet bloc. An author described in 1947 the benefits that the Soviet system afforded to Soviet inventors: "Research and professional invention is a select career and its practitioners enjoy above-average income, housing, food and clothing rations, and educational advantages for children." 127 While rations were not an issue in
Czechoslovakia for most of 1945-1989, other advantages certainly made significant differences to Czechoslovak inventors: professional advancement, 128 educational advantages for inventors 129 and their children, priority in selection for research and travel fellowships, 130 priority in awarding trade union-organized vacations, 131 and priority in housing waitlists 132 were among the precious benefits that inventors could enjoy in Czechoslovakia. 133 State awards and titles, 134 and the possibility that the invention could be named after the inventor 135 were additional bonuses; these bonuses served as useful "flagging" devices that could be utilized in applications of various sorts to the benefit of the inventor and his family. Naturally, in practice the enjoyment of all of the benefits and advantages was conditioned on the inventor and his family diligently following the overriding requirement of faithfulness to the political expectations of the communist party.
136
The increase in the number of protected inventions in 1957-1989 can be attributed to the development of institutional mechanisms for the support of patenting. In Czechoslovakia, which was a country with a planned economy, even patenting was subject to planning 137 patent office coordinated the centralized planning of the numbers of applications; every ministry had to supply data about numbers of applications to be filed in a given year within its area of competence, and the plan was calculated down to the level of individual enterprises. 139 For example, a lawyer in charge of patenting in one of the companies of the Škoda Holding
Company recalled that in his company the target was set at one point to 23 inventions per year and later to 30 inventions per year -with an increase in the target each time the target had been met. 140 It is fair to assume that the patent office faced similar political pressures to produce sufficiently high numbers of patents and author's certificates, although the examiners tried to meet the goals without compromising the quality of the patent examination process.
The patent laws were also designed to maximize the numbers of applications filed and inventions protected. According to the 1957 and 1972 patent laws, an employee-inventor was obligated to inform his employer immediately about his new inventions, and employers were obligated to systematically register and administer the inventions created by their employees. 141 If the inventor did not file an application for a patent or author's certificate with the patent office in a given period, the employer was required to file on the inventor's behalf. 142 The employer had to provide representation for the inventor in the proceedings before the patent office, 143 and as the administrator of the invention the employer was charged with securing the utilization of the invention "in accordance with the interests of the state and national economy."
144
Centralized planning not only at the state level but also at the level of the Soviet bloc (within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 145 was an attempt to replace the functioning of markets in the absence of a market economy, and had significant negative effects on inventive activity. Enterprises were directed to specialize in certain areas of production, and they could not develop their specialties independently, using their natural advantages. Centralized planning, dictated specializations, and constrained international cooperation that was limited to the Soviet bloc all had the effect of eliminating competition among enterprises and secured for the enterprises a steadily planned sales volume that required no innovation from them or their suppliers. Czechoslovak enterprises had insufficient exposure to competition in their respective fields 150 and limited, if any, contact with sophisticated customers whose demands would have driven innovation and inventive activity in the enterprises. 151 Production was dictated to satisfy customers that were located primarily in the Soviet bloc, and as a result some enterprises curtailed or abolished their research and development activities because sales to their customers were mostly dictated by the plan.
IV. Conclusions
The pre-1989 patent system in Czechoslovakia was a mixture of the legacy of the pre-WWI era modern and developed Austrian patent system that Czechoslovakia inherited when it split from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, and the strong dictates of communist ideology, which was imposed on Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union after 1948. The ideological influence was somewhat less pronounced in the latter half of the 1960s during the Czechoslovak reform movement, but found firm ground again in the 1970s during the "political normalization" that followed the Prague Spring and the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets in 1968.
Fluctuations in the numbers of patents and author's certificates followed stronger or weaker political pressures to produce patentable inventions, rising when state planning took over the economy and a push for higher numbers of patent applications intensified. As was often the case in the planned economy, a concern for quantity overrode quality; although proper examinations of patent applications took place and resulted, presumably, in patents and author's certificates being granted only for patentable inventions, many of the inventions were apparently of minimal or no use.
Although the system provided incentives to inventors, the structure of the incentives was different from that of the western patent systems, in which remuneration and the ability to exclude others from utilization (i.e., access to injunctions as a remedy for infringement) played and do play a primary role. Remuneration was one of the incentives offered under the Czechoslovak patent system; injunctions, although formally available under Czechoslovak patent law, were not accessible to the vast majority of inventors, whose inventions were in state hands and could therefore be utilized in any state enterprise (meaning in the absolute majority of enterprises in the country) without any notification to the inventor. 153 One commentator saw the system as a patent law built on a kind of a compulsory license designed to meet the needs of society.
154
Remuneration was important for Czechoslovak inventors; in the system of leveled wages that existed at the time, in which wage differences in various jobs were marginal, additional remuneration for inventions and improvement proposals was the only possibility for many people to secure additional income. Social pressures and feelings toward moral obligations, which the system used as an appeal in the late 1940s and early 1950s, proved to be insufficient as incentives; remuneration turned out to be the most effective incentive, so a greater emphasis on and increased interest in remuneration appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. 155 The system desperately sought additional means of motivating inventors; the extreme scarcity of opportunities -for job advancement, housing allocation, research stipends, etc. -provided leverage for the state in giving rewards to those whom the communist party considered as deserving of additional benefits. Becoming an inventor or an author of an improvement proposal was one of the possible routes to the benefits. 153 As one commentator observed, "the owner of a private patent [could] not by the help of an exclusive right assume a monopoly position towards the State or the community." Vida, supra note 54, p. 900. 154 
Id.
155 See supra note 123 on the remuneration maximums in Czechoslovakia in 1957 and 1986.
It is not possible to assess the impact of the Czechoslovak patent system on the creativity of the individual persons who operated within the system. Because of the inflated planning-driven numbers of patents and author's certificates, the statistics on patent applications and the numbers of patents and author's certificates granted is not useful in determining the true inventive potential in the country at the time (other than perhaps the creativity of communist state bodies).
On the one hand, the system generated a great degree of cynicism in the population about inventive activity, since the activity was subject to fervent communist rhetoric and obscure planning pressures. On the other hand, the isolation of Czechoslovakia from the West, in combination with the limited (but available) access to information about technological developments in the West, generated a certain creativity among the Czechoslovak people -who lacked but desired access to products from the West. Although much of this creativity did not lead to novel patentable inventions, it drove the development of an individual creative potential that, perhaps absurdly, some consider to be in danger now when the population finally has smooth access to products from all over the world and therefore no longer needs to rely on their own ingenuity to replace unavailable foreign products with domestically developed equivalents.
The negative effects of the communist system on the technical expertise of the Czechoslovak patent office were limited. Technical experts continued to work at a high level of quality, as they were used to doing in the pre-1948 Czechoslovak patent office -"Austria-style," as one of the leading Czech intellectual property law experts noted in his recollection of the times. countries, patent experts knew of the developments in patent law in the West, and some of the experts also published articles and books that referred to both foreign and international patent law developments. 157 In the early 1960s the patent office created the Institute of Industrial Property Law Education -the first educational institution of its kind in the Soviet bloc -which educated numerous practitioners about industrial property. 158 Of course there were also patent office employees whose work was politically oriented; these persons worked in the department of the office that was devoted to the planning of inventive activity. The patent examination department, with its high level of technical expertise, and the planning department, with its infusion of political influence and highly politically-charged activities, lived separate lives, which was highlighted by the fact that although both departments were located in Prague, the patent examination department was housed in a different physical facility from the planning department.
Two aspects of the pre-1989 Czechoslovak patent system might be surprising: First, there was never a formal compulsory license granted in Czechoslovakia; although Czechoslovak patent statutes provided for the possibility of a grant of a compulsory license in exceptional cases, 159 the Czechoslovak government never used a compulsory license. 160 Only in one instance before 1989 did a matter occur in which a consultation concerning a compulsory license was requested of the patent office: The Ministry of the Chemical Industry consulted the patent office about the possibility of granting a compulsory license on a patent held by a western company. However, the patent experts involved in the consultation discouraged the Ministry from pursuing the license. It might seem that a political system that did not respect private property would also decline to respect patent rights; indeed, such was the case with the rights of domestic inventors, most of whom were deprived of exclusive patent rights in favor of the state. However, in cases involving foreign patent holders, state concerns about the international reputation of the Czechoslovak patent system, the potential loss of international respect, and possible international legal disputes prevailed, and the system protected the rights of foreign patent holders.
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The second surprising aspect of the Czechoslovak patent system is the frequency with which disputes over remuneration for inventions and improvement proposals occurred and the fact that the disputes were not "swept under the rug" but actually were subject to mediation and court proceedings. For the communist system, the disputes were important because they were a useful propaganda tool for a system that claimed, above all else, to be favorable to the working class, to 
